Pritchard (2012) proposed to revitalize the analytic project about knowledge: offering an informative and non-circular characterization. He believes that this depends on noticing that two main intuitions about knowledge imply two independent conditions. I argue that we can characterize knowledge using only the anti-luck condition. I do not offer only a response to Pritchard´s argument but I also develop an alternative strategy, unnoticed by Pritchard, but based on his own assumptions regarding the anti-luck condition. I claim that an evidentialist characterization of safety makes it dependent on an ability condition. I strengthen the defense of anti-luck epistemology discussing this characterization.
Wajnerman Paz, A. (2017). A defense of Anti-luck Epistemology: On the Relation between Safety and Ability. Revista De Filosofía, 72, pp. 183–200. Retrieved from https://revistadematematicas.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/47605
